Is Any Action Good in Itself?

Do we ever have all-things-considered reason not to perform the act with the best overall consequences?

I will argue that there is better rational grounding for the theory that the consequence of an action is the only morally relevant factor than for the opposite and that we, therefore, do not ever have a reason not to perform an act which produces the best consequences. I will call the theory that the rightness of an action consists in the goodness of its consequences, ‘consequentialism’. I will explain one line of argument for consequentialism, comparing it with non-consequentialism, and then consider an objection and its rebuttal. Finally, I will briefly intimate whether I think this accords with the bible.

The philosophical perspective
Firstly, the discussion will be helped by a clarification of the significance of the term ‘consequence’. This will tell us whether there is an ontological or logical category of morals or ‘good’ which is wholly distinct from consequence. If there is not, then there is no possible alternative to consequentialism. A form of non-consequentialism is that the rightness of an action is in the absolute goodness (or badness) of the action itself. Killing is prohibited precisely because killing is wrong. Supposedly, the act itself possesses the moral value, rather than the consequence of the act. Or at least, the act in effect is the determinative factor. However, is there any meaningful distinction between the following two propositions: “I ought not to kill because killing is wrong” (non-consequentialism) and “I ought not to kill because killing would result in death” (consequentialism)? The distinction between killing and causing death appears to be effectively linguistic-only. Surely killing is wrong because death is wrong. For example, non-consequentialism has been defended by appealing to a situation where killing one person would save the lives of fifty other people. The absolutist would say the death of fifty lives would be obligatory based on the wrongness of the act of killing. However, the problem with this is quite evident. Again, the distinction between act and consequence is blurred. Take for example, if I was asked to stab one person in order to save the lives of fifty. The act I would perform would consist of something like moving a knife so as to penetrate the flesh near the heart. But the physical movement itself is not what is wrong, even for the non-consequentialist; the physical movement, in many other situations, would not ‘kill’. It is the fact that the physical movement causes the tearing of a vein, the loss of blood, the cessation of brain function etc., which renders the physical movement ‘wrong’. In other words, the moral value of the physical movement is located in its direct consequences. What then, for the so-called non-consequentialist, renders the indirect consequences of an action morally irrelevant (assuming that there is equal certainty of the occurrence of the indirect consequences as of the direct ones)? Both are consequences; it is a matter of degree, not category. The only apparent difference is that the death of fifty is simply less proximate in terms of time or geography to the decision-maker than the single death. If this is the case, the non-consequentialist is groundless in declaring the fifty deaths irrelevant or non-determinative.

My second point is the lack of evidence for the intrinsic moral value of an action. Granting, for the sake of argument, that there is a reasonable and relevant distinction to be made between direct and indirect consequences, and that only direct consequences are relevant, there are still problems with the non-consequentialist approach. If killing really is wrong, utterly regardless of whether life is preserved overall, this leaves a marked vacuity in ethical prescriptions and prohibitions. If the preservation of life is the reason for an absolutist prohibition against murder, then overall life should also be considered. If it is not the reason, then we are left only with intuition to advocate it. I am not arguing that there cannot be anything intrinsic about an action that renders it evil, but simply that we do not know of one. Divine command theory may well propose a situation where moral value is imbued upon certain actions in themselves, but this either becomes utterly arbitrary or appeals to consequences (e.g. glorifies God, strengthens character etc.). There is nothing available to us that vouches for the absolute moral value of certain acts apart from consequences. Not only is there no way to verify a non-consequentialist prohibition against murder, but there is also no way to falsify it. If I was persuaded of the wrongness of murder in the absolutist sense, nothing could convince me otherwise. Even if my declining to murder quite foreseeably caused ten-times the amount of suffering, death and moral degradation (apart from the immorality of the act itself) than the murder, this would still not falsify the absolutist value of the act. Without being able to meet these two basic standards of verification and falsification, non-consequentialism is left comparatively anaemic.

However, there is some weight to the common objections to consequentialism. One is asked to imagine a situation where a horrendous act is required in order to produce the best consequences. For example, torturing a prisoner may lead to information concerning the enemy and eventually the ending of a war and the saving of many lives. But the burden of the dissident is that the full moral weight of the act of torture must not be overlooked. The intensity of the pain and personal degradation, existential despair and the contravention of human rights as well as the long-term psychological effects are to be acknowledged. Furthermore, what is required of the torturer is significant. He treats another human being without respect, sympathy or mercy- simply as a means to information. The decay to the moral fibre and social sensitivity of those who order, perform or regulate the act would be serious and certain. These obvious components of the act could be seen as verifying or falsifying the deontological prohibition. Torture always violates the natural dignity of man, therefore torture is always wrong. So, says the non-consequentialist, no matter how good the consequences may be, the act itself is wrong, so we are ethically bound to refrain from it. Just as I would not eat a bowl full of broken glass in order to have a banquet. 1. I would not endure the pain, and 2. The blood from my gums would make the banquet unpleasant.

Moreover, absolute prohibitions are the backbone of society. If every individual was permitted to perform any action that he or she felt produced the best consequences, laws would be meaningless and ineffectual. Morality would become relativistic and even effectively nihilistic. I could effortlessly perform an act I know to be wrong and yet, to all others be justified because I claim it produces the best consequences. An ethical system where murder, rape and torture may be, not just permitted, but obligatory, would disintegrate. The ‘goodness’ it seeks to promote would be negated by its disregard of the ‘goodness’ preserved by absolute constraints.

It must also be argued, however, that this concern for the proper moral weight of certain actions can also be sufficiently accommodated by consequentialist theory. Firstly, it should be understood that there is nothing inherent to consequentialism that denies the horrendous nature of acts of violence and murder. Deeming something necessary does not mean deeming it good. Deeming something morally right does not mean approving of the act in itself. If it is decided that torture is obligatory in a particular case it does not mean to say that torture does not violate the natural dignity of man. The consequentialist can and should recognise the extent of the pain and psychological damage done to both the tortured and the torturer. Not only can it be recognised but it can be disapproved of. In an ideal world, these would not occur, and by taking into account the eventual consequences, one is seeking to lessen their future occurrence. If, however, the suffering and damage caused directly in the act did in fact outweigh the future alleviation of the same, the consequentialist ought to decide against it. For the consequentialist it is, in fact, disapproval of the very suffering that torture causes directly, which would deem torture necessary. It is the violation of the natural dignity of man caused by torture, which would deem torture necessary.

Similarly, consequentialism is not necessarily blind to the effects of violating a general prohibitory injunction on the legal and (more broadly) ethical system of society. If the decision-maker saw that any likely societal decay resulting from the act would outweigh the positive results then she ought to decide against it. But it may be the contention of the consequentialist that societal decay is just as likely to result from the indirect consequences of the act. Namely, the ongoing war and consequent death may be more detrimental to the society’s moral fabric.

A prohibition can be both non-absolute and meaningful. For example, a prohibition would be generally enforced, and infringement cases would be brought to court and judged as to whether the defendant had proportionate reason for the act (e.g. self-defence). Consequentialism would not allow a driver to pass through a red light just because he feels that getting to a wedding on time is more important than the prohibition. It would require the driver to judge whether the possible consequences of crashing the car, being caught and the slippery slope to general lawlessness is better than the consequence of embarrassment on arriving late at the wedding. I have used these examples to show that it is not necessary for consequentialism to lead to moral decay on the level of the individual, society or government.

The argument, as I previously indicated, must be disputed in one final respect. That is, the argument is forced to presuppose the principle of the theory it opposes. Consequentialism not only considers distant consequences but also that which is concomitant to the action (e.g. moral decay of the torturer). This means only the consequentialist can appeal to them. The physical, psychological and societal damage highlighted by the absolutist are consequences of the action so they should be irrelevant to the non-consequentialist. It could be argued that the violation of human rights, on the other hand, is innate in the action, not consequent. However, how arbitrary is the line being drawn? There is no specific criterion being appealed to which distinguishes effect from constituent property. On the contrary, violation of human rights can rightly be thought of as a consequence of torture. Torture results in the violation, not vice versa. Although it can also be thought of as a necessary property of the action itself; it is both concurrent and resultant. If it is a consequence, then it would be incorrect to object that consequentialism cannot account for it. On the whole, the problem with the non-consequentialist objection is that it draws attention to evidence seen in the consequences of an action in order to demonstrate that we are not always obligated to produce the best consequences. It is self-defeating.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that there may well be a good reason to regard certain conditions of an action as separate from consequence. If this is the case, it is valid to claim that too exclusive a focus on consequences can lead to apathy towards the ‘intrinsic’ value of certain actions. On the other hand it is also appropriate to conclude that focus on consequences does not necessarily become a systematic disposal of legal system or belittling of the importance of rules. I understand consequentialism to be the proper overarching structure in which such values may be supported and realised.

Does Christian ethics agree?

I not only think that consequentialism is the only philosophically viable system, but that the bible also affirms it (not in these terms). God created man for his glory (Isaiah 43:7). This is the ultimate explanation for everything God says and does and commands. Therefore, every obligation we have, is an obligation because it glorifies God. That is, its goodness or badness is derived from that consequence. Glorifying and enjoying God is the chief end of man, in that, everything we do should be in order to do that. An otherwise 'good' action, is like filthy rags if it is doing anything but magnifying the infinite worth of God. Soli Deo Gloria.